



Language and Culture Archives

Mikasuki Dualism

Gilbert Prost

©1997, SIL International

Considering the value of the data, SIL is making this unpublished work available to the public.

License

This document is part of the SIL International Language and Culture Archives. It is shared ‘as-is’ to make the content available under this Creative Commons license:

Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
(<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/>).



More resources are available at: www.sil.org/resources/language-culture-archives.

Mikasuki Dualism
by
Gilbert Prost
Summer Institute of Linguistics

Introduction

The Mikasuki of South Florida are dualist not because of choice or cultural tradition, but by design. This unconscious design places ego either in nature as a material object subject to the laws of necessity or outside of nature as a transcendent, self-determining being. The constitutive members of this design manifest themselves in a categorizing matrix made up of a dual set of pronouns and a dual set of verbs. The two pronoun sets, Set I (-*ele*, 'I') and Set II (*cha*- 'I'), symbolize the transcendent and material selfs of Mikasuki selfhood. It is the transcendent-self which provides ego with the capacity of self-awareness, self-objectification, self-determination, moral law, as well as the grounds for discrete individuality, personality, and cultural diversity. It is the material-self which provides ego with an awareness that ego's body as well as mind are subject to the material and social forces of nature and society.¹ Complementing this dual set of pronouns are two primary verb classes manifesting two distinct types of behavior and states of being. There are -*e* stem verbs which manifest cultural, moral, and purposeful patterns of behavior and states of being. It is behavior which transcends natural causation. Secondly, there are -*a* stem nature verbs which manifest that both human and non-human objects in nature are conditioned by internal biological and external environmental stimuli to which they respond.

This categorizing matrix made up of a dual set of pronouns and verbs informs ego that personal existence in time and space is unique and one of a kind. It informs ego that while man exists in nature, man also transcends nature. It informs ego specifically about what is cultural and what is material, what pertains to the mind/spirit and the field of freedom and what pertains to the body and the field of material necessity, what is transcendent and moral and what is not, and etc. Despite the objections of anthropologist Marvin Harris who rejects the notion that such a matrix could actually inform ego to "think what is good" (1980:167), this paper proposes exactly that. The unconscious Mikasuki matrix informs ego to "think what is good," that is, to think of which types of behavior and states of being pertains to culture and which pertains to nature.

II The Ground Plan in the Psyche

Structuralists in the fields of sociology, anthropology, linguistics, psychology, and biology all tell us that if one is to understand human behavior, then it is generally more profitable to work with models constructed out of deeper-lying phenomena --that is, with the unconscious "ground plan" --not with the surface models of phenotypes and etic behavior. Besides the biological DNA code, some structuralists also believe that there exists a categorizing mental code (or codes) embedded in the psyche. For example, most linguists would probably agree that there exists an innate "ground plan in the psyche" which makes language building possible. Noam Chomsky has called this "ground plan" Universal Grammar. For Chomsky, linguistics is all about uncovering and understanding the "ground plan," the "capturing of those properties of language that are logically or conceptually necessary, properties such that if a system failed to have them we would simply not call it language" (1980:28).

¹ The dual pronoun system is described in *Structure of Mikasuki Selfhood*, MALC, 1996

Earlier in sociology, French sociologist Emile Durkheim postulated a similar "ground plan in the psyche" which accounted for human behavior, culture, and civilization. He called this ground plan the "collective conscience." It is this ground plan in the psyche which "furnishes the mind with the molds (structures) which are applicable to the totality of things and which make it possible to think of them"(1915:444). Today many anthropologists would probably refer to Durkheim's "conscience collective" by the term culture, that is, that set of standards which the "conscience collective" uses for informing ego what human existence is all about (Bohannon, 1964). Now for Durkheim, this ground plan was not innate, but rather, created in the psyche through the diachronic social interaction of free-spirited individuals. As such, the derived cultural construct could explain the presence of cultural diversity in mankind. It could not, however, account for its psychic unity. Because it fails to account for the universal, we deem it to be *culture in the psyche* with a lower case *c*.

Nevertheless, Durkheim believed in the constitutional unity of the human race. For Durkheim the psychic unity of the human race was grounded in the "constitutional duality of human nature." It was this "constitutional duality" which made human culture and civilization possible. "There must be something in man," he writes, "that gives rise to this feeling that his nature is dual (spirit-body), a feeling that men in all known civilizations have experienced. Psychological analysis has, in fact, confirmed the existence of this duality: it finds it at the very heart of our inner life" (1964:326). But that hidden "something in man" which causes one to see human existence as dual is also supported linguistically in the semantic categories which undergird Mikasuki selfhood. It is the existence of this unconscious categorizing code which informs the Mikasuki as to what types of behavior and states of being pertain to culture and the human spirit and what types pertain to the human body and nature, what types are moral and what types are amoral. Because linguistic evidence reveals that this code in the psyche can be rejected and modified through a process of naturalization thereby generating an alternative code with an alternate interpretation of reality, it raises some fundamental questions as to the essence of these two codes. The first we interpret as being innate and universal; the second, as being derived and particular. It is the universal which can be rejected for the particular. This rejection of the Universal for the cultural construct is manifested linguistically in *-e* stem verbs becoming *-a* stem verbs, a process of naturalization which inserts transcendent, cultural behavior into the field of nature. The vowel changes reveal an ontological shift away from human freedom to law as a means for solving the problems of material existence.

Though Chomsky views *language in the psyche* as innate and universal and Durkheim views *culture in the psyche* as derived, both, nevertheless, speak not only to what *is* but what *should be* in human existence. Just as language necessitates subjects, objects, and verbs in order for it to be language; culture necessitates transcendent, moral beings positioned above nature in the field of freedom in order for it to be culture. In either case, these codes are believed to exist in the psyche as universal standards for language-culture building. But now a new kind of structuralism has arrived on the scene promoted by post-modern Claude Lévi-Strauss. Instead of culture existing in the mind of man, it now said to exist in the "Mind" of Nature. For self-proclaimed "transcendentalist materialist" Lévi-Strauss (1966:246), "the unconscious....is always empty" (Lévi-Strauss quoted in Jenkins 1979:14). So instead of explaining culture in terms of codes, laws, guidelines, and archetypes in the mind, his goal is to explain culture in terms of "psycho-chemical reactions in the brain"(1966:247) which is homologous to the Mind-of-Nature. For Lévi-Strauss, culture or the deep structure is nature (Benoist, 1974: 26; MacCormack, 1980:4) and therefore the goal of the natural sciences should be that of "reintegration of culture in nature and finally of life within the whole of its physico-chemical conditions" (Lévi-Strauss, 1966: 247). Lévi-Strauss has reduced culture to biology.

But we must pause to ask all transcendental materialists the question: Why would Nature create beings who perceive themselves as transcending Nature? But more important, can history creating man now lose his transcendent position over nature in order to be "reintegrated" back into nature as Lévi-Strauss assumes? To put it another way, does man have the freedom to completely destroy his freedom over natural process? We believe not. But since the Mikasuki have already successfully inserted certain aspects of their Cultural Code into nature, then it would be prudent for us to attempt to understand what such positioning implies together with the social and linguistic consequences of such actions.

Interestingly, man's attempt to dehumanize man and society and reposition them in nature, is not something new. Despite the presence of an internal Dual Culture-Nature Code which clearly informs speakers of Mikasuki that human existence is constitutionally otherwise, the linguistic data reveals, we believe, that the Mikasuki have nevertheless been partially successful in naturalizing some key areas of human behavior. But to naturalize all of human behavior and to reposition man totally in nature as Lévi-Strauss envisions would ultimately result in the total destruction of man as a cultural being. But such freedom, we believe, man does not possess. Nevertheless, post-modern transcendental materialism tells us, "the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute, but to dissolve man," "to undertake the resolution of the human into the non-human" (Lévi-Strauss, 1966:246-7). "With Lévi-Strauss," De Gramont (1970:7) correctly writes, "the whole humanist tradition (which has emphasized human transcendence over natural process) goes down the drain. Instead of a free spirit, responsible for its decisions, we have man responding to programmed circuits called structures. The individual conscience is no longer relevant. The whole body of Western thought, from Plato to Descartes to Sartre, which held that knowledge began with knowledge of oneself, belongs in the natural-history museum, alongside the witchdoctor's headdresses."

Now the underlying assumption which supports a transcendental materialist's belief that mankind must be dehumanized and transcendental humanism destroyed is the belief that duality in life is the source of all evil. Because the members of the *culture-nature* dyad or the two selves of Mikasuki selfhood are perceived to be in fundamental opposition to each other rather than as complementary parts of a whole, there exists the Hegelian notion that the dyad must be dissolved because in the words of another transcendental materialist, "duality is the fundamental cause of suffering" (Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 1990:52). For Lévi-Strauss, this suffering is clearly manifested in the annals of history generated by transcendent man. Man, as both history and Lévi-Strauss correctly point out, clearly has a defect, for life certainly is filled with pain and suffering. So contrary to materialist theories of Marx and Sartre which portray history as a positive-oriented force propelling mankind to newer heights, Lévi-Strauss views history as a destructive power bringing disorder to the harmonies of Nature (1966: 245-269). The post-modern solution to the problem of pain and suffering in history is therefore to reduce history to myth, the diachronic to the synchronic, culture to nature, human to non-human, and freedom to law.

But the question still remains: how much can the categorizing code of duality embedded in the human psyche be altered by man's attempt to reposition man totally in nature? For example, can the *transcendent-self* as manifested by Mikasuki pronoun Set I (-ele) be completely deleted from the grammar because it has become a meaningless symbol or category in the psyche? We think not. Those who think otherwise fail to understand the constitutional nature of human freedom. "Man cannot, by taking thought, reduce himself (completely) to the proportions of nature, nor does he have the freedom to destroy his freedom over natural process any more than he had the freedom to overcome his precarious dependence upon nature (Buber, 1941:99). The Mikasuki Semantic Code supports

Buber's thesis that man constitutionally has been positioned between freedom and necessity, both in culture and in nature. He lives in the paradox of freedom and necessity.

III. The Ground Plan and the Cultural Construct

The notion of two distinct codes in the psyche, an innate universal and a derived particular is also the perspective of Marxist psychology. For the historical materialist human existence involves interaction between a material based innate Code which is universal and a derived code generated by transcendent cultural-historical activity. Just as a particular language is generated from Universal Grammar, it is from the primary material Code that man is able, according to Marxist psychology, to "create himself" through his labor, that is, create a second code or cultural construct, one which theoretically reflects his labor. As in the case of Universal Grammar, the second is not possible without the first (Riegel, 1970:19,20). Similarly, linguistic and anthropological analysis of Mikasuki selfhood supports the existence of two such distinct epistemologies or codes in the psyche. First, there is the innate Culture-Nature Code which positions man both above and in nature, a position which makes both human culture and history possible. Secondly, there is the derived code or cultural construct grounded in a Mikasukian view of reality.

The constituent members of the Culture-Nature Code consist of the dual pronoun system which manifest the transcendent-self (-ele) and the material-self (cha-) and the dual verb system which categorizes cultural and material behavior. First, in the following examples the dual pronoun Sets I and II are contrasted.

A. Transcendent and Material Pronoun Sets

Ego as a cultural being pronoun Set I (-ele)

anchom-ele, I am dressed.
akashom-ele, I am shaved.
faakeepom-ele, I am groomed.
noohaachom-ele, I cook.
tayk-ootom-ele, I am a woman.
nakn-oot-om-ele, I am a man.
heef-ootom-ele, I am morally good.
esh-ayyom-ele, I drive (control).
ommom-ele, I build.
aklom-ele, I desire, want, hope for.
apoom-ele, I speak (language).

Ego as material object in nature pronoun Set II (cha- or ach-)

ach-anokoolom, I am naked.
cha-choshkom, I am unshaved.
cha-pahakwom, I am uncombed.

cha-shannakom, I am pregnant.
cha-nakn-oosh-ootom, I am an old man.
cha-heef-ootom, I am healthy.
esh-cha-faykom, I detour (necessity).
cha-pechekchom, I bleed.
cha-baanom, I need it.
cha-helayh-om, I cry.

In the above examples we can see ego via the transcendent-self *-ele* involved in behavior which distinguishes man from the rest of nature. Man clearly is positioned outside of nature. Within nature, however, ego via the *material-self (cha-)* is informed about the body's existence in nature. Whereas in the state of culture the body can be clothed and groomed; in nature it is naked. Unlike the spirit/mind which can desire, the body has only needs, thus, when a Mikasuki says, "I need food" he is really saying "Me, that is my body, needs food," implying, its existence will be threatened if not fed.

We also take note of the fact that in the Mikasuki view of reality there exists no fundamental opposition between men and women as proposed in Lévi-Strauss's structuralism. Whereas Lévi-Strauss positions women in nature with the brute beast and men in culture, the Mikasukian innate Culture-Nature Code positions both men and women

in culture as transcendent equals and equally so in nature where they are subject to the contingencies of nature.

Cultural and Nature Verbs

Complementing this dualistic pronoun system which distinguishes man from nature is a dualistic verb system marked by the presence of *-e* and *-a* verb stems margins. The function of these two vowels is to categorize verbs in terms of (a) *transcendence, purpose, and culture*, and (b), *nature, cause-effect, and necessity*. Previous interpretations of these stem vowels include: (1) there exists "*little or no semantic or grammatical content*" (Boynton:1982), and (2), it reflects an arbitrary distribution of the vowels in causative formations in the distant past (Booker, 1991). How such conclusions concerning the presence of *-e* and *-a* vowels on verb stems were arrived at is certainly understandable if one is unaware that innate cultural universals can be naturalized and positioned under nature. Complementing this naturalization of the certain universal there has also occurred a complementary shift in stem vowels from *-e* to *-a* reflecting the change in epistemologies. This shift has made the distribution of these two vowels appear arbitrary. But this is not the case.

The following list of examples, taken primarily from David West's unpublished dictionary, are cited to demonstrate that there is a pattern to their distribution, but it is a pattern which can be modified to some degree, not by linguistic environmental pressures, but rather by ontological pressures coming from a contrary perspective on the nature of human existence. In the words of linguist Kenneth Pike, "A person (or society) may distort innate positive universals into negative particular actions" (1993: 63). But before examining the "oppositions" created by the Mikasuki ontology, we first note how the innate Culture-Nature Code has categorized behavior and states of existence as being dual through the use of *-e* and *-a*-vowel stems.

Behavior, actions, and states of being distinct from nature

Verb Stem Type #1
(culture verb root + *-e*-margin)

ääb-e-k, anointing
aay-e-k, being, existing, (sg. personal)
achan-e-k, praising, encouraging
äfn-e-k, sewing
ahäy-e-k, teaching
ahäkl-e-k, asking for
akäsh-e-k, shaving
äkl-e-k, hoping, knowing
alööb-e-k, covered with hat, lid, etc.
anch-e-k, dressing
anooch-e-k, dreaming
apoft-e-k, thinking about
-apt-e-k, waiting
ashatopahl-e-k, betraying
chahnääch-e-k, healing
eloosh-e-k, forgetting
emayook-e-k, laziness, sloth
chaöl-e-k, writing

Behavior, actions, and states of being embedded in nature

Verb Stem Type #2
(nature verb root + *-a*-margin)

achop-a-k, it sticks, adheres
afäy-a-k, drifting
afaaym-a-k, crooked
ahoon-a-k, ascending
apaksh-a-k, dawning
-atank-a-k, burping
atääf-a-k, learning (unconscious activity)
atööl-a-k, tripping, stumbling
awant-a-k, sticking to
-baan-a-k, needing
bashen-a-k, wrinkling
chahn-a-k, being well
chekf-a-k, stinking,
cheshkn-a-k, uncombed.
chokf-a-k, having cramps.
chompeel-a-k, defecating
chopkn-a-k, piling up
choshoo-w-a-k, urinating

chëel-e-k, changing clothes
 chetahm-e-k, paralyzed through fear
 chööp-e-k, buying
 ëëb-e-k, winning
 emäyb-e-k, forbidding one
 esh-honeech-e-k, envious
 fääy-e-k, hunting
 feek-e-k, pay, reward, bribe
 hampash-e-k
 häych-e-k, dressing up
 holaash-e-k, telling lies
 holtöp-e-k, barbecuing
 holway-e-k, joking
 hompaash-e-k, playing
 honck-e-k, give up, resign, quit
 hooch-e-k, grinding
 hook-e-k, stealing
 hööp-e-k, planting
 hötm-e-k, locking, sealing it
 kääsh-e-k, scrubbing
 kaloom-e-k, rancid (butter-cultural object)
 kaneel-e-k, sawing
 kapaay-e-k, divide
 fäyh-e-k, shooting
 nokt-e-k, borrowing
 ööholaash-e-k, to tell lies about one
 ööheefoom-e-k, to bless someone
 omm-e-k, making, building
 okaat-e-k, leading, directing
 okoonch-e-k, fasting, performing ritual
 pakf-e-k, it rises (bread- cultural object)
 shamaah-e-k, fainting
 shahaay-e-k, teaches, proves
 tääf-e-k, weaving
 takaloosh-e-k, confused, mixed up
 takääf-e-k, commanding
 täf-e-k, making bracelet
 täfp-e-k, skewer, string beads
 telëeksh-e-k, kneeling
 tentabaksh-e-k, engaged to marry
 tentan-e-k, arguing, quarreling
 yaam-e-k, the way it is mentally

Purposeful Behavior

Verb Stem Type 3
 (neutral verb root + -l- 'tr' + -e- 'margin')

abösh-l-e-k, roasting, vt.
 achöö-l-e-k, increasing, vt.
 afon-l-e-k, wrapping, vt.
 anö-l-e-k, using up, vt.
 apäsh-l-e-k, toasting vt.
 (tel-) -away-l-e-k, offering (themselves), vt.
 baf-l-e-k, breaking in two, vt.

el-a-k, dying
 -eef-a-k, existing, being (impersonal)
 emp-a-k, eating, grazing
 em-onk-a-k, remains the same
 esh-shaanank-a-k, becoming pregnant
 esh-taalobook-a-k, sinking
 etb-a-k, lukewarm
 ewan-a-k, tired
 fekon-k-a-k, to hiccough
 hafeeb-a-k, yawning
 hakank-a-k, limping
 haki-a-k, hearing
 hayaa-k-a-k, laughing
 helayh-a-k, crying
 kashaak-a-k, it breezes
 kofokn-a-k, rusted
 faban-a-k, filling
 faknesh-k-a-k, itchy
 fanëy-a-k, surfacing, coming out
 napoloo-k-a-k, dazed, stunned
 napolook-a-k, dazed, stunned
 nafaal-a-k, choking
 nook-a-k, sick, in pain
 -ochaaf-a-k, hungry
 -onk-a-k, the way it is materially
 pachakf-a-k, flat
 pakf-a-k, swelling
 pashohl-a-k, thirsty
 pateelf-a-k, mildewed
 pechekch-a-k, bleeding
 ponchk-a-k, spitting
 shabaak-a-k, finding (chance)
 shanaak-a-k, pregnant
 tash-a-k, unseasoned
 talakch-a-k, uncooked
 tapeek-a-k, suffocating
 teeshkam-a-k, squinting
 tofk-a-k, spitting
 washaak-a-k, being lost (chance)
 -waan-a-k, tired
 welekn-a-k, abating (pain)
 yasheln-a-k, frowning

Passive Behavior

Verb Stem Type 4
 (neutral verb root + -l- 'vi' + -a- 'margin')

abösh-k-a-k, roasting, vi.
 achöö-k-a-k, increasing, vi.
 afon-k-a-k, coiling up, vi.
 anö-k-a-k, being used up, vi.
 apäsh-k-a-k, toasting, vi.
 away-k-a-k, to be offered, (marriage)vi.
 baf-k-a-k, breaking in two, vi.

belöö-l-e-k, bending it, vt.
 boch-l-e-k, twisting it, vt.
 bokshanee-l-ench-e-k, giving one a cold, vt.
 boshöh-l-e-k, smelling up (the house), vt.
 chelaf-l-e-k, to fell, knock down, vt.
 chashaa-l-e-k, hanging it, vt.
 cholaa-l-ench-e-k, making it sticky, vt.
 eshyeel-ench-e-k, making dirty, vt.
 fanëë-l-e-k, twisting it, vt.
 fash-l-e-k, sharpening it, vt.
 feshah-l-ench-e-k, causing to breathe, vt.
 feesha-l-ench-e-k, causing to live, vt.
 feshashää-l-e-k, spraying, vt.
 fetah-l-e-k, sharpening, vt.
 folok-l-e-k, whistle, vt.
 ketäh-l-e-k, unloosing it, vt.
 kataf-l-ench-e-k, causing to collapse, vt.
 kösh-l-e-k, cutting it, vt.
 lehah-l-ench-e-k, causing decay, vt.
 feh-l-ench-e-k, making it stiff, sore, vt.
 nefaa-l-e-k, chipping off, vt.
 okshäh-l-e-k, washing, vt.
 opah-l-ench-e-k, cause to bathe, vt.
 payah-l-e-k, stretching, vt.
 pelaa-l-e-k, to pour, drop, vt.
 pof-l-ench-e-k, folding up, vt.
 shabäh-l-e-k, planting, vt.
 shatapäh-l-e-k, breaking, vt.
 shenëë-l-e-k, stretching, vt.
 tafä-l-e-k, melting, vt.
 tapöh-l-e-k, exploding, vt.
 tapotöö-l-e-k, putting together, vt.
 toloop-l-ench-e-k, make jump, bounce, vt.
 yeefëë-l-e-k, burning, vt.
 wanëë-l-e-k, peeling, vt.
 weteeh-l-ench-e-k, making angry, vt.
 wetaa-l-e-k, to open (valve), vt.
 wohoh-l-ench-e-k, causing to bark, vt.
 wolöö-l-e-k, circling, vt.

belön-k-a-k, it is bending, vi.
 böch-k-a-k, it is twisting, vi.
 bokshanee-k-a-k, having a cold, state
 boshoh-k-a-k, it stinks, vi. state
 chelaf-k-a-k, it falls over, vi.
 chashää-k-a-k, it is hanging, vi.
 cholaa-k-a-k, sticky, state
 eshyee-k-a-k, dirty, state
 fanëë-k-a-k, twisting, vi.
 fash-k-a-k, sharp, state
 feshäh-k-a-k, it/he is breathing, vi.
 feshah-k-a-k, alive, state
 feshäh-k-a-k, spraying, vi.
 fetäh-k-a-k, sharpening, vi.
 foloh-k-a-k, sound of wind, vi.
 ketäh-k-a-k, coming loose, vi.
 katääf-k-a-k, collapsing, vi.
 kosh-k-a-k, to be cut, state
 lehäh-k-a-k, it is rusting, decaying, vi.
 feh-k-a-k, to be stiff, sore, state
 nefaa-k-a-k, to be chipped, state
 oksha-k-a-k, drenched, state
 opah-k-a-k, bathed, state
 payäh-k-a-k, stretching, vi.
 pelan-k-a-k, falling, vi.
 pof-k-a-k, folded, vi.
 shaba-k-a-k, planted, vi.
 shatapäh-k-a-k, breaking, vi.
 shenen-k-a-k, stretching, vi.
 tafan-k-a-k, melting, vi.
 tapöh-k-a-k, exploding, vi.
 tapoto-k-a-k, existing side by side, state
 tolööpk-a-k, bouncing, vi.
 yeefen-k-a-k, burning, vi.
 wanëë-k-a-k, peeling, vi.
 weteeh-k-a-k, angry, state
 wetan-k-a-k, it is opening, vi.
 wohöh-k-a-k, barking, vi.
 wolon-k-a-k, circling, vi.

At the heart of structural analysis lies the question raised by transcendental materialist Edmond Leach. That question is: "How is it and why is it that men, who are a part of Nature, manage to see themselves as 'other than' Nature even though, in order to subsist, they must constantly maintain 'relations with' Nature?" (1970:129). Why, for example, does man universally prefer to eat cooked (noohek) food, a modification of nature, when, in fact, he can eat it raw (talakchak)? Do the Mikasuki cook (noohaachek) their food because they are compelled by an innate Universal Culture-Nature Code informing them that man is to act differently from the rest of nature, or, do they arbitrarily chose to do so because it tastes better cooked than raw? Does the -e 'culture' versus -a 'nature' unconscious categorization of Mikasuki existence have anything to do with the way they act? Is cooking food grounded in an innate Universal Culture-Nature Code which makes it "natural" to cook one's food and "unnatural" to always eat it raw, or is it grounded in the personal preferences of man and society, thus making it an arbitrary rule of man's own making? In this regard, Mikasuki Semantic categories lend support to the position that such behavior is indeed compelled or encouraged by some kind of Universal Culture-

Nature Code. The Mikasuki, as well as the rest of mankind, are universally informed to cook their food to demonstrate symbolically that they indeed do indeed transcend Nature and that *-e* stem verb behavior is distinctly different than *-a* stem verb behavior. But transcendental materialism has thus far failed to explain the rationale for such a Universal Culture-Nature Code of human transcendence existing in the Mind-of-Nature for the brain to decipher.

IV. The Mikasuki Culture-Nature Matrix

When the dual sets of pronouns and verbs are combined into a categorizing matrix, that is, when the *transcendent-self (-ele)* is combined with the *-e* and *-a* stem verbs and the *material-self (cha-)* with the *-a* and *-e* stem verbs, there emerges a semantic matrix which informs ego that life can be: (I), lived as a transcendent, culture being in the sphere of freedom; as (II), a *transcendent-self* able to alter the impulses of nature affecting ego, or as (III), a "naturalized" ego who has lost control over transcendent existence, or as (IV), a *material-self* totally subject to the impulses of nature and the laws of necessity.

Ego as Subject	Behavior, Actions, and States of Being	
	-e verbs	-a verbs
1. transcendent-self (-ele)	I ego as "other than nature" vowel -e + -ele	II ego over nature vowel -a- + -ele
2. material-self (cha-)	III "naturalization" of ego cha- + vowel -e-	IV ego affected by nature cha- + vowel -a-

A. Sphere I (Pronoun Set I + *-e* stem verbs)

In Sphere I of the above matrix the *transcendental-self (-ele)* functions as a self-determining, moral being capable of initiating action in the field of culture and freedom marked by *-e* stem verbs. In it we have a uniting of both the *transcendent-self (-ele)* and the cultural and purposeful verbs. Some examples of the culture/purpose verbs and the *transcendent-self* pronoun *-ele*, 'I' functioning in the field of freedom are:

-e verbs of culture and purpose -e verbs + pronoun set I (-ele)

äab-e-k, anointing
äfn-e-k, sewing
ahäy-e-k, teaching
anch-e-k, dressing
chaöl-e-k, writing
chöomp-e-k, buying
fäy-e-k, hunting (implies weapon)
holäash-e-k, telling lies
kaneel-e-k, sawing

äëbom-ele, I am anointing.
äfnom-ele, I am sewing.
ahäyom-ele, I am teaching.
anchom-ele, I am dressing.
chaölom-ele, I am writing.
chöömpom-ele, I am buying.
fäyom-ele, I am hunting.
holääshom-ele, I am lying.
kaneelom-ele, I am sawing.

abösh-l-e-k, roasting	aböshlom-ele, I am roasting it.
achöö-l-e-k, increasing	achöölom-ele, I am increasing it.
anö-l-e-k, using up	anolom-ele, I am using it up.
apäsh-l-e-k, toasting it	apäshlom-ele, I am toasting it.
bäf-l-e-k, breaking in two	bäflom-ele, I am breaking it in two.
belöö-l-e-k, bending it	belönlom-ele, I am bending it.
fanë-l-e-k, twisting it	fanëlom-ele, I am twisting it.
kösh-l-e-k, cutting it	koshlom-ele, I am cutting it.

B. Sphere II (Pronoun Set II + -a stem verbs)

In Section II we encounter the sphere of two wills, the will of man and the "will" of nature. While the "will" of nature may inform ego through its impulses that he or she must eat to relieve hunger, drink to relieve thirst, urinate to take pressure off one's bladder, blow one's nose to clear the passage for air, cough to clear one's throat, etc., the *transcendent-self* (-ele) has some control over such impulses. As a self-determining ego (-ele), the *transcendent-self* may over-ride and suppress these impulses. Nature may be informing me that I need to eat (empak) and drink (eshkak) as manifested by the vowel -a in these two verbs, but as a transcendent-self (-ele) I have the freedom to refuse and ignore these impulses to eat and drink. In fact, I may even be willing to suffer the consequence of overriding these impulses and thereby suffer the material consequences, namely, death (-eelak). Some examples of man's control over the impulses of nature are:

-a verbs of nature

choshöow-a-k, urinating
emp-a-k, eating
esk-a-k, drinking
-el-a-k, dying,
fëëshk-a-k, blowing nose
yechk-a-k, chewing
tofonk-a-k, coughing
chompeel-a-k, defecating

-a verbs + pronoun set I (-ele)

choshöowom-ele, I am urinating.
empom-ele, I am eating.
eshkom-ele, I am drinking.
elom-ele, I am committing suicide.
fëëshkom-ele, I am blowing my nose
yëchkaom-ele, I am chewing.
tofonkom-ele, I am coughing
chompee-l-om-ele, I defecate

C. Sphere III (Pronoun set II + -e stem verb)

In Section III we have ego existing in the twilight zone between consciousness and unconsciousness, control and non-control, action and inaction. It represents a process of naturalization of the *transcendent-self* with its ability to think and act rationally into the *material-self* where ego mind is being affected by social and material forces. Though the *transcendent-self* has the capacity for self-determination, it nevertheless is a power which can be suspended, paralyzed, or even lost. through poverty, fear, anxiety, loneliness, self-deception, forgetfulness, senility, envy of others, etc. This loss of control over transcendent existence is grammatically manifested by the collocating of -e stem verbs with the inactive *material-self* pronouns of set II. Though the behavioral patterns are unique to man as a cultural being, they nevertheless represent a loss of ego's control over personal existence. This dulling of ego's capacity for goal achievement can be seen in the following verb example of -e stem verbs which collocate with the *material-self* (cha-).

anooch-e-k, dreaming
 shamaah-e-k, unconsciousness
 takaloosh-e-k, confused, mixed up
 shonapaah-e-k, fooled, deceived
 eloosh-e-k, forgetting
 chetahm-e-k, catatonic state,
 emayook-e-k, laziness, sloth
 emmahyoob-e-k, loneliness
 nahaylom-e-k, stagger (drunk)
 esh-honeech-e-k, envy
 nofoom-e-k, being poor

ach-anoochom, I dreamed
 cha-shamaahom, I am fainting.
 cha-takalooshom, I am confused.
 cha-shonapaahom, I have been deceived.
 cha-looshom, I forgot.
 cha-chetahmom, I am immobilized by fear.
 cha-mayookom, I am lazy.
 cha-mahyoobom, I am lonely.
 cha-nahaylomom, I am staggering.
 esh-cha-honeechom, I am envious.
 cha-nofoomom, I am poor.

D. Sphere IV (Pronoun Set II + -a stem verbs)

In section IV ego, though his body, is emerged completely in nature as a passive object affected by internal biological and external environmental forces. The use of the *material-self cha-* 'I' positions man totally under the impulses of nature. Examples are:

haki-a-k, hearing
 pechekch-a-k, bleeding
 paashok-a-k, thirsting
 falätk-a-k, snoring
 feshahk-a-k, breathing
 tofonk-a-k, coughing
 washaak-a-k, being lost
 helayhk-a-k, 'crying'
 wan-a-k, tired
 -nook-a-k, sick

cha-haklom, I can (physically) hear.
 cha-pechekchom, I am bleeding.
 cha-paashokom, I am thirsty.
 cha-falätkom, I am snoring.
 cha-feshahkom, I am breathing.
 cha-tofonkom, I am coughing.
 cha-washaakom, I am lost.
 cha-helayhkom, I am crying.
 cha-wanom, I am tired.
 cha-nookom, I am sick.

VI. The Naturalization of Culture and the Creation of Oppositions

All the linguistic data thus far presented falls neatly into one of four ontological spheres of existence: (A) ego as "other than nature;" (B) ego exercising limited control over nature's impulses; (C) ego dehumanized by psychological, biological, social, and economic pressures; and (D) ego's material existence totally affected by nature. But life is never so tidy and mechanical that a single matrix can explain everything there is to know about Mikasuki behavior. In the case of the Mikasuki, there also exist patterns of behavior which are not in accord with the general "Ground Plan" manifested in the above Culture-Nature Matrix. As such, they represent a Mikasukian attempt to naturalize certain aspects of the Innate Code by inserting man and society into nature where this behavior will be compelled rather than free-willed.

This de-culturalization or naturalizing of human existence is clearly revealed in a number of culture verbs which have experienced a shift from *-e* vowel (culture) to *-a* vowel (nature). For example, the anthropologist-linguist must ask the question: Why do culture specific verbs like *awakak* 'marriage,' and *enkak* 'gift-giving' have *-a* stem vowels instead of *-e* stem vowels? Why has such human specific behavior been positioned under nature rather than culture where such transcendent behavior belongs? A vowel shift has certainly occurred and the pressure for such a shift clearly did not come from the phonetic environment. If not from the phonetic environment, then from where? The pressure which caused this vowel shift came, we believe, directly from a second epistemology, a Mikasukian ontological construct or derived code more concerned about material existence and survival in nature rather than what it means to be a truly free, cultural being positioned over nature. This *-e* to *-a* vowel shift represents an ontological shift from culture to nature,

a Mikasukian attempt "to undertake the resolution of the human into the non-human" (Lévi-Strauss, 1966:246). This process of de-culturalization of Mikasuki existence has been accomplished primarily through transforming free-spirited benefactors into obligatory benefactors. In such a cultural construct the obligatory benefactors are controlled by the beneficiaries. As such, most of Mikasukian existence is lived under law instead of grace and freedom.

A. Mikasukian Naturalization of Culture.

This Mikasuki *will-to-control-the-benefactor* in order to guarantee its own survival is clearly reflected in the ontological question raised by Sartre when he asked, "What does the Other mean *for-Me*?" His answer was: "...the other seeks to enslave me...while I seek to enslave the other" (1956:265). A Mikasuki would answer Sartre's question by replying: "the other seeks to make me an obligatory benefactor while I seek to make the other the same *for-me*. It is a more subtle kind of enslavement, nevertheless an enslavement which is central to understanding Mikasuki behavior. It is an enslavement grounded in the dative *for-me*.

Now embedded in Sartre's *person-with-person* dyad is endless conflict. It is viewed as a struggle in which each member of the dyad is vying to dominate the Other and in the words of Sartre, "possess" the other in a subject-object, *possessor-possessed* relation. But for the Mikasuki, "possession" and control of the Other cannot be expressed in a subject-object *possessor-possessed* relationship because the Mikasuki lexicon contains no words for *have*, *own*, and *possess*. Neither does it contain any real possessive pronouns such as *my*, *your*, *his/her*. This absence of a *possessor-possessed* grammatical construct in the language means that it is impossible for them to ground their identity in *possessing* and *having* college degrees, bank accounts, big houses, fancy cars, and powerful positions like their American friends do. Instead, Mikasuki life and identity are grounded in the obligatory dative '*for-me*' plus the *being* verb *-eefak*. The Mikasuki life-way is all about *existing-for*.

Now theoretical linguists John Lyons of England and Hansjacob Seiler of Germany both have something important to say about the verb *having*, which is non-existent in the Mikasuki lexicon, and *existing-for*. They both tell us that *have* verbs, for some unknown reason, have developed out of *being* verbs and "are of relatively late development" (Lyons, 1986: 392). "Why does it notoriously happen," Seiler asks, "that in the course of time a verb originally meaning 'to seize', 'grasp', or 'hold', thus a dynamic verb for the most part, turns into a stative verb 'to have'? And that in the course of time a Latin construction like *mihi est domus* 'for-me-exists-a house' is being replaced by another construction *habeo domum* 'I have a house' in so many languages?" (1983: 67). We might rephrase the question slightly and ask, Why, in the course of time, have we shifted from a *voluntary benefactor-beneficiary* epistemology to a *possessor-possessed* epistemology of enslavement and control? The answer appears to be that we really prefer to control and enslave people rather than to trust them to *voluntarily-exist-for-us*. We simply do not believe or care to take the risk that our benefactor, whoever that might be, will truly choose to do this. The role of the "benefactor," therefore, must be brought under the control of the beneficiaries. So just as an epistemological shift pressures some *-e* stem verbs to become *-a* stem verbs in Mikasuki, a shift from freedom to control, the same epistemological shift has forced a diachronic shift in other languages from *voluntarily-existing-for-the-Other* as expressed by the dative to verbs of *having* and *possessing* in order, in the words of Sartre, "to enslave the Other" (1956:143). In both cases, the linguistic shifts reflect a diachronic epistemological shift from faith in the Other to distrust of the Other.

Since this enslavement of the Other cannot be expressed grammatically in Mikasuki with verbs of *having*, *owning*, and *possessing* as in 'I have a husband' where such control may be implied, this control of the Other must be found elsewhere. For the Mikasuki it is buried away in a pseudo *benefactor-beneficiary* relationship expressed by the dative *for-me* and the *being* verb *-eefak*. For example, 'I have a husband' is always given in Mikasuki as *halk-ot am-eefom*, 'The man exists-for-me.' But the particular *being* verb the Mikasuki have chosen to express this relationship is interesting. Instead of using a *being* verb which classifies existence in terms of humanity, culture, and freedom, namely *ayyek* 'he/she actively exist purposefully,' they use a *being* verb which classifies existence as impersonal under nature and the laws of necessity, namely *-eefak*, 'it/nature (obligatorily) exists.' Since the *being* verb *-eefak*, 'it is existing' is an *-a* stem verb taking an obligatory dative we are able to deduct the following: first, the *-a* vowel informs us that the behavior is compelled instead of voluntary; secondly, *-eefak* 'it exists' with the obligatory dative tells us that all things in nature were designed to specifically *exist-for-someone*. This tells us that the Mikasuki see man as being uniquely positioned in the universe. Interestingly, this ontological perspective of nature being designed specifically *for-man* happens to be in accord with the controversial anthropic principle of physics which says basically the same thing about the universe, earth, and man (Lightman, 1991:117-21). Finally, the use of the impersonal *being* verb *-eefak* tells us that husbands in the Mikasuki ontology have been reduced from *Thou* to *it*, from being voluntary benefactors operating in the field of culture and freedom to being obligatory benefactors operating in the field of nature and the laws of necessity. By inserting man into nature they have created a fundamental opposition in the psyche between the innate Culture-Nature Standard and their own. A few examples of this naturalization process and the fundamental opposition it has created can be seen in the following examples.

1. Mikasuki Marriage: A Cultural Event or Nature Event?

In Mikasuki society one may express the marriage act as either a transcendental, cultural *-e* vowel behavioral event which is in harmony with the innate Cultural Code, or as a nature *-a* vowel behavioral event dictated by a cultural construct which has naturalized the conjugal bond. Therefore, one may describe a particular marriage archaically as *tel-awaylek* 'voluntarily offering themselves to each other,' or, as *awaykak*, 'offered up to (another)'. This latter is sometimes prefixed with *tayk-* 'woman' informing us that it is men who are offered to women in marriage. At any rate, marriage now is categorized as a nature *-a* behavioral event which has been moved out of the sphere of freedom to that of control.

After marriage the conjugal bond is viewed from two very different ontological perspectives. One perspective is grounded in the innate Culture-Nature Code and the other in the cultural construct. There is that of the husband who views marriage from the perspective of culture, freedom, intimacy, equality, and the nuclear family. Then there is wife who views marriage for the perspective of nature, law, and what does it mean *for-me* and my matrilineal kin. These contrasting perspectives are manifested linguistically through what linguists generally refer to as "alienable" and "inalienable" possessive pronouns, a "traditional exclusive categorization...which must be given up in favor of a functional framework" (Seiler: 1983:81). Since possession is not a semantic category within the Mikasuki psyche then what do these glossed dual "possessive pronoun" sets, the material *cha-* and dative *-am*, symbolize? We suggest that the material *cha-* 'me' + the Other symbolizes a state of intimate complementarity and that the dative *am-* 'for-me' + the other symbolizes a ego-centric *for-me* desire to control objects "meant to be for-someone" (Sartre:1956:141). In one case the husband is relating to an *Other* in freedom; in the second, the wife is relating to a dehumanized object in nature she expects to serve her.

In this case, it is the wife who speaks of her relation to "her husband" as a *for-me-man* relationship expressed with the dative *-am*. When we add the implied information, namely the *being* verb *--ee£ak*, we see that it is a *man-who-obligatorily-exists-for-me* relationship. For the husband, the wife's use of the dative symbolizes enslavement; for the wife it means control of the object. In contrast to this we have the husband's ontological perspective. He describes the marriage bond in metaphorical terms by using Set II pronouns(*cha-*). It is a *cha-halke* or 'me-wife' relation, not a 'my-wife' relation as traditionally glossed. As such, it symbolizes a functional positioning of the wife in relation to the husband. She is perceived as an "inalienable" attachment analogous to all of one's body parts which are necessary for the healthy functioning of the whole. She is a necessary complement within the whole. It is a material metaphor used to describe what *should be* in the marriage bond and life of the family. Sociologically, "inalienable" attachments symbolize intimacy, complementarity, and trust in the relationship.

But the Mikasuki husband who views his wife as an "inalienable attachment," an attachment which should make the nuclear family/household the most intimate in society, either hasn't really caught up with reality or doesn't have the linguistic means available to express the ontological shift. That shift has been from culture and freedom to nature and law, from priority of the nuclear family to priority of the clan. The ideal intimacy which once made *husband-wife* the dominant dyad, the dyad of transcendent freedom,² has been supplanted by a new dyad, a dyad grounded in nature, law, and material necessity. That dyad is the *sister-sister* dyad which supports the matrilineal clan system and covert matriarchy. So while the husband archaically see his wife as one who should be intimately attached to him, his wife sees it otherwise. She sees herself intimately attached to her sisters, an intimate grouping which makes the matrilineal clan and covert matriarchy possible. The Mikasuki female ego classificatory kinship system makes this clear. It classifies all males with the exception of sons as being in a dative relationship, that is, a system which declares that all males within the system with the exception of sons *exist-for-females*. As one female informant said, "We are Amazonian women. We are in charge." As such, however, it is a grouping grounded in nature rather than culture and freedom.

The ontological consequences of naturalizing marriage and giving priority to the *sister-sister* intimate grouping is to give marriage a new meaning. No longer can marriage be defined archaically as *tel-awaylek*, a 'voluntarily offering themselves to each other,' or, as the joining of two individuals who have chosen "to exist-for-the-Other," but rather as the joining together in nature of a genitor and a conceiver in order to produce needed offspring for the *sister-sister* materially based matrilineal clan. Such repositioning of *husband-wife* from culture to nature has also redefined the meaning of sexual intercourse. No longer is it *-e* verb behavior, but rather *-a* verb behavior. When positioned in culture sexual intercourse was archaically referred to *akleecheke*, 'a getting to intimately know the Other.' In his unpublished Mikasuki dictionary David West notes that *akleecheke* is an "old word." As such it was a transcendent archaic act in culture. Today sexual intercourse has been reduced to a purely biological act descriptively referred to as *apaachkak*, 'the insertion of a pole into a receptacle.'

Along with the naturalization of the husband's role in marriage there has occurred a complementary naturalization of all male activity which has come under the control of his wife and in-laws. First we note, the traditional matrilineal residence rule allows him no choice as to where he might wish to reside. He is obligated to leave his place of residency

² Concerning content of freedom embedded in an intimate husband-wife bond, Francis Hsu (1972:527) writes, "The overall kinship content most commensurate with the emphasis on husband-wife dyad is individualism and self-reliance." One of the benefits of husband-wife intimacy is social freedom.

and join, as an outsider, the camp of his wife, her sisters, and her parents. Secondly, such a move for the male symbolizes a move out of the sphere of culture, freedom and *-e* stem verb behavior into sphere of nature, law, and *-a* stem verb behavior. Contrary to the Lévi-Strauss's view that the camp represents culture and the forest represent nature (1963:135), for the Mikasuki male it is the reverse. It is the camp which symbolizes nature and the forest symbolizes culture. In the forest one is free; in the camp one is enslaved. It is the sphere where his labor (*takaafkak*) is controlled by others, where the falling trees (*wachkak*) for swidden agriculture is for his in-laws along with the splitting of firewood for the camp (*chaakak*). All such activities have been naturalized and placed under the control of the matrilineal based camp. He is working on land which his wife's clan controls and living in houses which specifically *exist-for-them* and not *for-him*. Everything he does in the camp is obligatorily done *for-them*. The only way to escape such control is to leave the camp which had de-humanized him and enter the forest to hunt (*faayek*). Hunting, since it occurred in the field of freedom, was one activity they could not control. However, as soon as he brings the game into the camp, that freedom ends.

B. Gift-giving (enkek > enkak)

In the Western world a benefactor is viewed as one who voluntarily gives to Others that which he controls as a steward. Not so among the Mikasuki. Because the role of a benefactor has been naturalized, the role is not voluntary but obligatory. This is especially evident in the act of gift-giving as reflected in the *-a* vowel in *enkak*, '(obligatory)gift-giving.' The Mikasuki "gift-giver" is compelled by the cultural construct to give to others. As soon as the son-in-law brings his catch into camp he steps into the sphere of compelled behavior. Such is also the expected role of a Mikasuki tribal chief. A Mikasuki chief's role is similar to that of chiefs among the matrilineal Trobriand Islanders of whom Malinowski wrote, "to possess is to give.....A man who owns a thing is naturally expected to share it, to distribute it, to be its trustee and dispenser. And *the higher the rank the higher the obligation*....generosity is the essence of goodness (1922:97). As obligatory gift-givers the Mikasuki tribal chief is expected to obtain from the government benefits which in turn will be distributed to the tribal members. It is Mikasuki law, a law which finds itself in fundamental opposition to a Mikasuki Culture-Nature code which promotes freedom and voluntary gift-giving.

C. Singing and dancing.

Two other activities which have been removed from the sphere of culture and freedom (*-e*) and placed in the field of nature and material necessity (*-a*) are *talwak* 'dancing' and *hopaanak*, 'singing.' This diachronic vowel change from *-e* to *-a* reveals just one more important ontological shift. It reveals a rejection of a belief in providence, that is, the belief that there exists a personal Benefactor who cares for them, to a belief in magic, that is, the belief that certain rites, like singing and dancing, can transform impersonal Nature into an obligatory Benefactor *for-them*. Contrary to what most people believe, magic is not a cultural act; it is a material act like eating and drinking because it involves "the naturalization of human actions --the treatments of certain human actions (such as singing and dancing) as if they were an integral part of physical determinism" (Lévi-Strauss, 1966:221). Densmore (1972), writing on the function of Seminole music wrote, "*Song and dance movements are believed to make animals 'feed close in' and be more easily found by the hunters.*"

Conclusion:

Juxtaposed between the paradox of freedom and necessity man lives in a position of unescapable stress and insecurity. His positioning makes him anxious. It is his nature to be anxious. However, how he chooses to relieve those anxieties is crucial not only for his

material existence but also for his psychological-spiritual existence. The linguistic data reveals a Mikasuki design for life which has attempted to relieve those anxieties over existence by reducing their fellow man to objects in nature, objects which are compelled by customary law to *exist-for-the-Other*. In the process, however, they have created some fundamental opposition to an innate Universal Code which informs man that he is constitutionally free. These fundamental opposition in the psyche, we believe, are real and need to be resolved if Mikasuki society is to experience wholeness. Finally, if the Mikasuki high mortality rate among Mikasuki males is to decline along with their chronic drunkenness, then the Mikasuki male must be removed from nature where their fellowman have inserted them and be restored to their rightful place in culture and freedom.

Bibliography

- Benoist, Jean-Marie. 1974. Classicism Revisited: Human Nature and Structure in Lévi-Strauss and Chomsky. In: *The Limits of Human Nature*. E.P. Dutton & Co.: New York
- Bohannon, Paul. 1964. Conscience Collective and Culture. In: *Essays on Sociology & Philosophy*. Harper Torchbooks: New York.
- Booker, Karen M. 1991. Mikasuki Stem Vowels: An historical explanation. In: *Proceedings of the Mid-America Linguistic Conference*. Tina Bennett-Kastor, compiler. Wichita State University: Wichita.
- Boynton, Sylvia. 1982. *Mikasuki Grammar in Outline*. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Florida. Gainesville, Florida.
- _____. 1982. *Split Ergativity in Mikasuki*. MALC
- Chomsky, Noam 1980. Rules and Representations. Colombia University Press: New York.
- Densmore, Francis. 1972. *Seminole Music*. Da Capo Press: New York
- Derrick-Mescua, Mary Tyler. 1980. A Phonology and Morphology of Mikasuki. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Florida. Gainesville, Fl.
- Durkheim, Emile. (1914), 1964 The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions. In: *Essays on Sociology & Philosophy*. Harper Torchbooks: New York.
- _____. 1915. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. J.W. Swain, translator. Allen & Unwin: London.
- Harris, Marvin. 1979. *Cultural Materialism, The Struggle for a Science of Culture*. Vintage Books: New York.
- Hsu, Francis. 1972. Kinship and Ways of Life. In: *Psychological Anthropology*, ed. Francis L. K. Hsu. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co, Inc.
- Jenkins, Alan. 1979. *The Social Theory of Claude Lévi-Strauss*. Macmillan: London.

- Leach, Edmund. (1967) 1970. Brain-Twister. In: Claude Lévi Strauss, *The Anthropologist as Hero*. eds: Hayes, E. Nelson & Tanya Hayes
- Lévi-Strauss, (1962) 1966. *The Savage Mind*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
- _____. 1963. *Structural Anthropology*. Basic Books Inc. New York.
- Lightman, Alan. 1991. *Ancient Light*. Harvard Press: Cambridge, Mass.
- Lyons, John. 1968. *Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- MacCormack, Carol P. 1980. Nature, culture and gender: a critique. In: *Nature, Culture and Gender*. Eds. Carol MacCormack and Marilyn Strathern. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
- Pike, Kenneth. 1993. *Thought, Talk, and Things, the emic road to conscious models*. SIL: Dallas. *Knowledge*
- Prost, Gilbert 1996. The Structure of Mikasuki Selfhood. In: *MALC (Mid-America Linguistic Conference, 1994)*. University of Kansas: Lawrence. Vol II, p. 629-643.
- Riegel, Klaus F. 1975. Structure and Transformation in Intellectual History. In: *Structure and Transformations*. Eds.: Klaus F. Riegel and George C. Rosenwald. John Wiley & Sons: New York.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1956. The Meaning of "To Make" and "To Have": Possession. In: *The Self*, ed. Clark E. Moustakas. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Seiler, Hansjakob. 1983. Possession as an Operational Dimension of Language. In: *Language universals series: Vol 2*, Gunter Narr Verlag: Tübingen.
- West, David. Unpublished dictionary. Summer Institute of Linguistics.
- Yogi, Maharishi Mahesh.